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A Report On Reporting: Why Peers Report Integrity and Law 
Violations in Public Organizations
Th e 2004–2005 archives of three bureaus of integrity 
are analyzed in order to study the reasons for reporting 
integrity and law violations within public organizations. 
Peer reporting accounts for only a small percentage of 
cases; most investigations originate from routine and 
continuous institutional controls. What are the reasons 
peers choose to report or not report? A sense of justice 
is most important, followed by self-protection and 
protection of the wrongdoer. Th e most important reason 
for or against coming forward 
is the reporter’s fear of negative 
consequences. One surprising 
rationale for not reporting is that 
an individual feels responsible 
for the wrongdoer’s punishment. 
Six propositions are elicited from 
this research as well as speciﬁ c 
pragmatic recommendations 
for management procedures to 
improve reporting of integrity 
and/or law violations.
The importance of attending to integrity violations in public administration is evident. Integrity violations 
harm trust in government (cf. Nieuwenburg 2007) 
and lead to substantial ﬁ nancial losses and organiza-
tional problems (Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 1989a). We 
note here that integrity violations can be, but are not 
necessarily, legal violations, and that “unethical” and 
“illegal” are diﬀ erent. When we refer to “integrity vio-
lations” in the remainder of this article, they are to be 
understood as “violations of integrity and/or the law.”
In a study of corruption (De Graaf and Huberts 
2008), the peers of corrupt oﬃ  cials often had suspi-
cions—sometimes even evidence—that something 
was wrong long before the investigation, but kept the 
information to themselves. Th e study describes the 
process of becoming corrupt as a “slippery slope,” and 
in some cases, even the corrupt oﬃ  cial wished he had 
reported earlier so that he could have been stopped 
when the case was relatively minor. Th e sooner the 
integrity violation is discovered, the sooner action can 
be taken to minimize damage. Newspapers occasion-
ally report a governmental integrity violation. Some-
times it is clear how the violation was discovered, 
often not. In this study we ask, who reports integrity 
violations in public organizations, what are the viola-
tions, and why? Th e aim is to formulate advice on 
integrity management for public organizations to 
facilitate “good” reporting of integrity violations.
We structure our research 
around two questions. Th e 
ﬁ rst is, how do investigations of 
integrity violations within public 
organizations get started? In other 
words, who ﬁ rst reports the 
violations? Literature on this 
question is sparse. Nelen (2003) 
and Huberts et al. (2004) have 
reported that in the Netherlands, 
cases are initiated by citizens, 
 coworkers, and supervisors in 
fairly equal shares. Th ey also 
warn that their ﬁ gures are tentative and may or may 
not diﬀ er according to the type of violation. 
Th e second research question is, what are the reasons 
for reporting integrity violations in public  organizations? 
According to Treviño and Victor, “Co-workers who 
are willing to monitor their peers’ behavior and 
report violations to management represent a poten-
tially important supplemental control resource for 
 organizations” (1992, 38).
New data will be presented on this article’s two 
research questions. First, we discuss the theoretical 
background of the study and deﬁ ne its key concepts. 
We then propose typologies of integrity violations 
(the “what” in “who reports what”) and reporters 
(the “who” in “who reports what”). We follow with a 
general discussion of the literature on whistle-blowing 
with respect to the reasons potential peer reporters 
have to report. We then describe the study back-
ground and methodology: where and how the data 
We structure our research 
around two questions. Th e 
ﬁ rst is, how do investigations of 
integrity violations within public 
organizations get started? … 
[S]econd, … what are 
the reasons for reporting 
integrity violations in public 
organizations?
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were collected, the explorative design, the study of the archives of 
three public organizations, and the reporter interviews. In the fol-
lowing three sections, we present the ﬁ ndings on the two research 
questions, list propositions elicited from the research, and discuss 
them in the context of current literature. We conclude with impli-
cations and recommendations for public integrity management.
Theoretical Background
Some Key Concepts of the Study Defi ned
A reporter is deﬁ ned here as one who discloses information about a 
perceived integrity violation to someone who has the ability to eﬀ ect 
action (cf. Near and Miceli 1985, 4). Th e reporter has no author-
ity over the accused and thus lacks the power to directly rectify and 
punish. Th e reporting of integrity violations includes at least three 
parties, each of which takes action in response to the other (cf. 
Å´kerstrom 1991, 16; Near and Miceli 1996, 508): the reporter, the 
wrongdoer, and the information receiver. Th e reporter takes three 
steps: observing an act (a broad category—hearing, for example, can 
be included), deﬁ ning the act as an integrity violation, and reporting 
the act (cf. Near and Miceli 1996, 508).
Integrity is deﬁ ned broadly as the quality of acting in accordance 
with relevant moral values, norms, and rules. In the public context, 
integrity “can be thought of as individuals upholding the obligation 
of oﬃ  ce by implementing public programs in accordance with laws 
and rules, as well as in support of the public intent or the collec-
tive trust” (Blijswijk et al. 2004, 719). Th e focus here, however, is 
on integrity violations: behavior that violates relevant moral and/or 
legal values, rules, and norms. Note that many integrity violations 
are also legal violations, but not necessarily so. Unethical and illegal 
are not one and the same. In this article, we therefore use the term 
“integrity violations” as shorthand for “violations of integrity and/or 
the law.”
Typology of Wrongdoing
Categorizing the “what” in “who reports what” is a necessary step in 
researching how investigations get started in the ﬁ rst place. Th e type 
of wrongdoing has previously been related to whistle-blowing (e.g. 
Near et al. 2004), but mostly in the context of whether the type of 
wrongdoing aﬀ ects the whistle-blowing process rather than where 
reports come from or how they surface. Near et al. (2004) conclude, 
based on a survey of a large U.S. military base, that employees who 
observe perceived wrongdoing involving mismanagement, sexual 
harassment, or unspeciﬁ ed legal violations are signiﬁ cantly more 
likely to report than those who observe stealing, waste, safety prob-
lems, or discrimination. Th e authors also conclude that the type 
of wrongdoing makes a diﬀ erence in the whistle-blowing process 
and should be examined further in the future. (For a similar study 
within American police agencies, see Rothwell and Baldwin 2007).
Th is study employs a typology of integrity vio-
lations derived from an analysis of the litera-
ture on integrity and corruption by Huberts, 
Pijl, and Steen (1999).1 Th e types of integrity 
violations are considered universal and thus 
useful for describing unethical behavior in 
almost all (public) organizational contexts. 
Lasthuizen (2008) recently succeeded in a ﬁ rst 
validation of the typology.
Table 1 Types of Integrity and/or Law Violations
1. Corruption: Bribing
Misuse of public power for private gain; asking, offering, or accepting 
 bribes
2. Corruption: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage
Misuse of public authority to favor friends, family, or party
3. Fraud and theft 
Improper private gain acquired from the organization (with no involvement 
 of external actors)
4. Confl ict of (private and public) interest 
Personal interests (through assets, jobs, gifts, etc.) that interfere with 
 public interests
5. Improper use of authority (for noble causes)
Use of illegal or improper methods to achieve organizational goals 
 (e.g., illegal methods of investigation or disproportionate violence by 
 police) 
6. Misuse and manipulation of information
Lying, cheating, manipulating information, or breaching confi dentiali ty
7. Discrimination and sexual harassment 
Misbehavior toward colleagues or citizens and customers 
8. Waste and abuse of resources
Failure to comply with organizational standards, improper performance, 
 incorrect or dysfunctional internal behavior 
9. Private time misconduct 
Conduct in an employee’s private time that harms the public’s trust in 
 administra tion or government
Typology of Reporters
To determine how investigations get started in the ﬁ rst place, a 
useful classiﬁ cation of reporters is needed. According to the litera-
ture (e.g., Å´kerstrom 1991; King and Hermodson 2000; Miceli, 
Near, and Dworkin 2008; Near and Miceli 1996; Rothschild 
and Miethe 1999; Treviño and Victor 1992; Zipparo 1999), the 
reporter–wrongdoer relationship and whether the reporter has a 
prior interest in the case are important factors. Th us, reporters can 
be distinguished along three dimensions: (1) whether the reporter is 
internal (reporting from within government) or external (reporting 
from outside government), (2) whether the reporter has an interest 
in the case, and (3) whether the reporter and the alleged wrongdoer 
have a work relationship (relevant only when the reporter is inside 
the government).
Table 2 Logical Classifi cation of Reporters
Case-Disinterested Case-Interested
Reporter Not coworker Coworker Not coworker Coworker 
Inside government 1 4 2 3
Outside government 6 n.a. 5 n.a.
Reporting in the Literature
Th e second research question focuses on the reasons for reporting 
integrity violations—the “why” question—which we can begin to 
answer by reviewing the literature. We will see 
that the reasons to report are straightforward 
in all categories of reporters save one: peer 
reporting.
Th e literature, while vast, is primarily centered 
on whistle-blowing. Several enlightening 
reviews (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 
2005; Maesschalck and Ornelis 2003; Miceli, 
Th e types of integrity violations 
[used in this study] are 
considered universal and thus 
useful for describing unethical 
behavior in almost all (public) 
organizational contexts.
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Near, and Dworkin 2008; Near and Miceli 1996; Vandekerckhove 
2006) summarize the (mainly) quantitative studies on whistle-
blowers and whistle-blowing. Th eir emphasis is on the personal 
characteristics of the whistle-blower, and on predicting and ﬁ nding 
the determinants of organizations at high risk of whistle-blowing 
(Vandekerckhove 2006, 13). Many factors are associated with the 
likelihood of whistle-blowing, internal and external. Th ey mostly 
correlate with aspects of various levels of the reporting process, 
including the reporter’s personal characteristics (gender, self-esteem, 
personality traits, religion) and situational aspects (type of alleged 
wrongdoing, quality of supervision, status of the recipient, organiza-
tional integrity policy, and so on).
Several scholars have stated that peer reporting can be considered 
a type of whistle-blowing behavior (e.g., Treviño and Victor 1992; 
 Victor, Treviño, and Shapiro 1993). However, knowing which 
conclusions to adopt from the general whistle-blowing literature 
when looking for the reasons for peer reporting in the public sector is 
diﬃ  cult. Th e studies on whistle-blowing tell us much about common 
characteristics and organizations but, because they are mainly quanti-
tative, say little about the process of deciding to report.2 Maesschalck 
and Ornelis (2003, 539) note that for insights into the deeper mecha-
nisms of whistle-blowing, survey research will not do and qualitative 
research is necessary. Since then, interesting qualitative studies have 
been conducted, putting public whistle-blowing in (a public) context, 
such as a study by Johnson (2003) concentrating on external whistle-
blowers, and a study by O’Leary (2006) on government guerrillas, 
who sometimes become whistle-blowers (but most do not).
Furthermore, many studies on whistle-blowing in the last two 
decades have concentrated on private sector organizations. Does this 
compare to public sector feelings and actions concerning reporting? 
Th ere is strong evidence that it does not: Brewer and Selden (1998) 
conclude that federal whistle-blowers act in ways that are consistent 
with the theory of public service motivation (see, e.g., Houston 
2006; Lewis and Frank 2002; Perry and Wise 1990). Miceli, Near, 
and Dworkin say, “Recent research suggested that there may be 
eﬀ ects of industry in whistleblowing—speciﬁ cally, for example, that 
whistleblowers cluster in public rather than private or not-for-proﬁ t 
sectors” (2008, 85).
A third diﬃ  culty in adopting general conclusions from the whistle-
blowing literature is that nearly every study’s deﬁ nition of whistle-
blowing is diﬀ erent (cf. Chiu 2003; Jubb 1999; Vandekerckhove 
2006). Are the behaviors comparable, or do they simply share the 
same name? Based on Jubb (1999) and Vandekerckhove (2006, 22), 
we can distinguish seven elements of whistle-blowing with ambigu-
ous deﬁ nitions: act, actor, outcome, motive, subject, target, and 
recipient. Unlike the whistle-blowing literature, in which cases often 
are reported by the media, more than 99 percent of the reports in 
the studied archives were internal. Although both internal and 
external reporting are part of its deﬁ nition, “whistle-blowing” 
implies a lot of noise, and thus is indicative of external reporting 
(cf. Chiasson, Johnson, and Byington 1995; Johnson 2003). 
Can the reasons for reporting a colleague to the media be 
the same as reporting a  colleague to the boss?
Another important aspect is the report target: “whistleblowing 
literature has focused primarily on reporting the wrongdoing of 
superiors rather than the wrongdoing of peers” (Victor, Treviño, 
and Shapiro 1993, 253). Much whistle-blowing literature is about 
organizational wrongdoing, with management as the responsible 
party. In the development of California’s Bay Area Rapid Transit 
system (Anderson et al. 1980), for example, the whistle-blowers 
faced a loyalty conﬂ ict between the public interest and their organi-
zation (Vandekerckhove 2006, 9). Based on the wider sociological 
literature, however, we can hypothesize that going outside one’s 
group (as in peer reporting) is a diﬀ erent kind of loyalty conﬂ ict: 
peer reporters have to balance their loyalty to a sense of justice (the 
organization) against their loyalty to the group in general and the 
wrongdoer in particular. As Pershing states, “Deciding how to react 
to occupational misconduct may be conceptualized as choosing 
between two conﬂ icting loyalties: to the institution of which one 
is a member and to organizational peers” (2003, 150). Further-
more, peers in public organizations wrestle with the government 
code of being loyal to the highest moral principle (Johnson 2003, 
27). Loyalty to immediate colleagues—the group—is often much 
stronger than loyalty to the organization (e.g., Heck 1992). Th e 
victim of betrayal may suﬀ er, but the betrayer does, too: “Associa-
tions of guilt or shame can linger on long after the act took place” 
(Å´kerstrom 1991, 19).
From the few studies that exist on peer reporting, it is clear that a 
serious decision has to be made, one that diﬀ ers starkly from many 
other types of reporting. Th is becomes clear by the value- and 
 emotion-laden vernacular of peer reporting: “snitching” (Pershing 
2003), “tattling,” and “ratting out.” Nor is the term “informer” 
neutral: it is loaded with negative associations (Å´kerstrom 1991). 
Whether peer reporters are labeled as heroes or traitors, cowardly or 
courageous, depends on the context and point of view. It is the result 
of a process of social construction that varies with time and place.
Research Background and Methodology
Settings
To study how integrity investigations get started in government and 
why they are reported, we studied the 2004 and 2005 archives of 
three bureaus: the Amsterdam police department’s Bureau of Inter-
nal Aﬀ airs (BIO),3 the city of Amsterdam’s Bureau of Integrity (BI), 
and the National Agency of Correctional Institutions within the 
Ministry of Justice’s Bureau of Integrity and Safety (BIS). Together, 
the BIO and BI are the integrity agencies for all the civil servants 
of the city of Amsterdam; the BIS represents a national ministry 
serving institutions nationwide. Collectively, these three bureaus 
represent a broad range of types of public employees, from the high-
est oﬃ  cials to street-level bureaucrats.
Th e three organizations are required by law to have whistle-blowing 
regulations that include protections from retaliation for whistle-
blowers. Th ese regulations exist in all three organizations, but 
recent research shows that most civil servants in the Netherlands do 
not know about them (USBO 2008). Furthermore, it was found 
that the current regulations for Dutch public oﬃ  cials hardly oﬀ er 
whistle-blowers any protection (USBO 2008). In the three organiza-
tions, it is possible to report anonymously at a central point in the 
organization. Reporters can also ask to report conﬁ dentially. Howev-
er, once a case turns out to involve unlawful conduct, conﬁ dentiality 
cannot be guaranteed. None of the organizations has a public record 
of fair treatment of whistle-blowers. Of the three organizations, the 
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BIO in particular has clearly articulated and reinforced statements 
of behavioral misconduct.
We obtained permission from each organization’s administration 
and agreed that no traceable details of any case would become 
public. Th e researcher spent 11 days investigating the archives of the 
Amsterdam police (171 and 168 cases in 2004 and 2005, respec-
tively), 6 days studying the archives of the city of Amsterdam (78 
and 140 cases), and 7 days studying the archives of the correctional 
institutions (104 and 128 cases).
Th e cases researched were the known cases within the respective 
organizations. Th is is clearly diﬀ erent from all integrity violations 
that actually took place, undoubtedly a much greater number. For 
the purpose of this study, however, it was most important that the 
cases be characteristic of those discovered and investigated in the 
Netherlands.
Indexing the Archives
Th e cases were studied to distinguish (1) the reporter, (2) the type 
of violation, (3) the reason(s) for reporting, and (4) consequences 
for the reporter. Th e information on the reporters diﬀ ered strongly 
among bureaus and cases, with one exception: most information 
was about the wrongdoer and the (perceived) integrity violation, 
not the reporter. In most cases, however, it was possible to trace the 
origin of the investigation. Files comprising only a page or so were 
generally cases that had been dismissed. Others contained of yards 
of folders. Th e police ﬁ les turned out to have the most—as well as 
the most interesting—information because police investigators have 
more power than investigators of other bureaus. Much valuable 
information was collected from ﬁ led interviews with reporters.
Documents and Interviews
Th e intensity of the peer reporting experience is not just a matter 
of personality or individual perception. It depends in large part on 
context (Å´kerstrom 1991, 19), and research methodologies must 
therefore take context into account. Th erefore, we employed qualita-
tive and explorative research so that every option, insight, and novel 
ﬁ nding based on any variable mentioned in the whistle-blowing 
literature was open for inspection.
Th e indexed archives were ﬁ rst studied to determine the reasons for 
peer reporting. We studied each case in its own nuanced context. 
Victor, Treviño, and Shapiro comment on the importance of actual-
ity: “Little previous research has been conducted on peer reporting 
of unethical behavior in organizations and no previous study has 
measured actual peer reporting behavior” (1993, 259–60). We 
kept special notes on every case that was labeled “peer reporting.” 
Archived reporter interviews gave especially useful information on 
the process of peer reporting, but, as previously mentioned, most 
archived information was about the wrongdoer and wrongdoing—
that is, evidence of an integrity violation. Th erefore, we decided to 
conduct our own interviews where possible.
To select the cases, ﬁ rst all cases that were labeled “peer reporting” 
were considered. Th en we eliminated some reporters because of 
restrictions, the most important of which was that the ﬁ le was still 
active. In the end, 27 requests for interviews were made and 25 were 
accepted, a more than adequate number: “[W]hile there is no ideal 
number of cases, a number between 4 and 10 cases usually works 
well” (Eisenhardt 1989b, 545).
Th e opportunity to so select the cases resulted in unique research 
material. It allowed us to avoid some pitfalls mentioned in the few 
whistle-blowing studies that have interviewed reporters. Rothschild 
and Miethe note,
Various approaches to the study of whistleblowers have been 
taken. Previous researchers have identiﬁ ed a small number of 
high-proﬁ le whistleblowers from media sources and per-
formed case studies (Glazer and Glazer 1989). Others (Jos, 
Th ompkins, and Hays 1989) have derived samples of whistle-
blowers from support agencies (e.g., Government Account-
ability Project), and still others have drawn a sample from a 
single occupation. Unfortunately, however, these strategies are 
limited because they tend to yield atypical samples (e.g., high-
proﬁ le cases). (1999, 108–9)
Th e main interview questions were about the reasons (not) to 
report. Th e process was then evaluated by the interviewee. Extensive 
notes were taken during each interview (no audio or videotape was 
used). About half of the interviews took place in the organization of 
the reporter. Th e other interviews took place at the workplace (uni-
versity) of the interviewer. Th e interviews, which lasted one hour on 
average, were often emotionally intense. In most cases, the reporters 
had thought long and hard before acting, meaning that the process 
of deciding to report and its arguments were vividly remembered by 
the interviewees. Th is diﬀ ers signiﬁ cantly from Johnson’s description 
of external whistle-blowers, who felt that certain factors so out-
weighed others there was “no deciding” (2003, 48). Our interview-
ees mentioned losing sleep before and after the ordeal.
To study the reasons not to report, we ﬁ rst planned to interview 
silent observers. Unfortunately, their names could not be elicited 
from the archives, and thus we stumbled on a study limitation. 
Th ose who were suspected of being silent observers denied knowing 
about the violation. Two-thirds of the reporters who were inter-
viewed deliberated extensively before acting (more on this later), 
meaning that they also vividly remembered the reasons they had not 
to report. It is likely that they are the same reasons that the silent 
observers chose not to report. Many interviewees conﬁ rmed this, 
stating they suspected that their own doubts about reporting were 
similar to silent observers’ reasons to not report. Yet no conclusions 
about nonreporters are drawn here.
Across-Case Analysis
After the within-case analyses (in this explorative study, ﬁ rst the 
nuances and context of every case were considered), it was neces-
sary to look for patterns across cases. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989b), the advantage of this design is that it allows the researcher 
to recognize general patterns in diﬀ erent settings and to generate 
theory in the form of propositions. Th e disadvantage of this design 
is that every case, with its own context and contingencies, has to be 
reduced to a more abstract level to enable across-case comparisons 
(Dyer and Wilkins 1991), and we wanted to generate theory in 
the form of propositions. To ﬁ nd across-case patterns, Eisenhardt 
suggests techniques that force investigators to go beyond initial 
impressions: “Overall, the idea behind these cross-case searching 
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tactics is to force investigators to go beyond initial impressions, 
especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses on the 
data” (1989b, 541).
Given our research strategy, we faced an immense quantity of data. 
We followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) suggestion to use a 
monster grid. On one axis of the grid are the 25 reporters; on the 
other are categories such as “mentioned reasons to report” and 
“mentioned reasons not to report.” Th e cells of the grid are not ﬁ lled 
with numbers, but with verbal comments and citations (Swanborn 
2003, 16). We derived patterns in the form of propositions from 
the grid, which were then juxtaposed with the empirical data. Th is 
inductive process was repeated many times before the impressions 
were written down.
Cross-Cultural Generalizability of the Study
All of the data in this study come from the Netherlands, which 
raises the question of generalizability to other countries. In their 
review article on whistle-blowing, Near and Miceli state, “We limit 
our discussion to whistleblowing in the context of U.S. society. 
Very little has been published on this topic outside North America 
and Great Britain … Th us research is needed to examine whistle-
blowing … in diﬀ erent countries” (1996, 508). Progress indeed 
has been made since that report in 1996. Recently, Miceli, Near, 
and  Dworkin (2008, 72) presented a list of 15 countries in which 
whistle-blowing had been noted.
A few comparative studies have also been conducted. Keenan 
(2002), for example, conducted a survey among American and 
Indian managers on perception variables on whistle-blowing, and 
compared Chinese and American managers on whistle-blowing 
(Keenan 2007). Sims and Keenan (1999) compared U.S. and Ja-
maican managers. Brody, Goulter, and Mihalek (1998) concluded 
that there are large diﬀ erences in ethical perceptions of American 
and Japanese students when it comes to whistle-blowing. Miceli, 
Near, and Dworkin (2008, 88–89) discussed work by Rehg and 
Parkhe (2002), in which theoretical predictions about possible 
interactions among organizational culture and societal culture 
are discussed, based on diﬀ ering power diﬀ erences. Furthermore, 
India, Israel, Russia, and the United States have been compared 
on (external) whistle-blowing on a country level (Johnson 2004). 
In sum, cultural context is indeed important. Miceli, Near, and 
Dworkin note,
It is easy to imagine how country or culture 
characteristics could aﬀ ect whether an 
observer believes she or he has witnessed 
wrongdoing, and whether anyone has the 
responsibility for reporting. Unfortunately, 
due to the paucity of research, it is too 
early to develop a taxonomy of country or 
cultural inﬂ uences on the observation of 
wrongdoing. (2008, 72)
Th e propositions coming out of our Dutch 
data will be compared with the relevant in-
ternational literature. To what precise extent, 
however, a Dutch study of integrity violations 
in public organizations can be compared to, 
say, the United States can be clariﬁ ed only by conducting further 
comparative research.
Who Reports What
How the Ball Gets Rolling
Th e logical typology of table 2 was crossed with the empirical mate-
rial from the archives, resulting in the following speciﬁ cations of the 
six categories:
1. Cases stemming from ongoing investigations (BIO); regular 
controls, accountant or police investigations (BI); or police 
investigations, security agencies, etc. (BIS)
2. Cases starting after something was stolen in the organization 
without a clear suspect (therefore no clear reporter–wrong-
doer relationship)
3. Cases stemming from a report by an administrator who was 
the (alleged) victim of the integrity violation
4. Cases stemming from peer reporting
5. Cases stemming from reports by citizens, customers, com-
panies, or prisoners who had an interest in the case
6. Cases stemming from reports by citizens, customers, com-
panies, or prisoners who had no interest in the case
Table 3 lists the rounded percentages of occurrence. Th e unknown 
category comprises primarily cases in which the researcher could not 
ﬁ rmly establish who made the initial report.
Table 3 Where the Reports Come from in the Three Organizations
Category description Percent
1 Information from regular controls, accountants, police 35–39
2 Theft 5–12
3 Peer reporting with the reporter as victim 6–12
4 Peer reporting 9 
5 Citizens, customers, companies, or prisoners who had an 
 interest in the case
15–29
6 Citizens, customers, companies, or prisoners with no interest 
 in the case
3–5
Unknown 8–14
First of all, it is notable that the impressions from Nelen (2003) 
and Huberts et al. (2004)—that violations are reported by citizens, 
coworkers, and supervisors in fairly equal numbers—were wrong. 
Nelen and Huberts et al. rightfully warned that their ﬁ gures were 
tentative, based on impressions rather than thorough research, and 
may diﬀ er according to type of violation. As 
Nelen and Huberts et al. argue, the veracity of 
the oﬃ  cial ﬁ gures on which they based their 
impressions was unclear. For example, a peer 
report is made to a supervisor; the supervisor 
decides to investigate. Often, in oﬃ  cial ﬁ gures, 
the supervisor becomes the reporter, not the 
peer. Nor do oﬃ  cial statistics clearly distin-
guish between peers, supervisors, accountants, 
and so on; they are all (in oﬃ  cial statistics) 
called colleagues.
Th e largest category included cases stemming 
from institutional controls within public orga-
nizations (35 percent to 39 percent), followed 
Th e propositions coming out 
of our Dutch data will be 
compared with the relevant 
international literature. To what 
precise extent, however, a Dutch 
study of integrity violations 
in public organizations can be 
compared to, say, the United 
States can be clariﬁ ed only by 
conducting further comparative 
research.
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by citizens who were (perceived) victims of an action by one or more 
public administrators (15 percent to 29 percent). In many cases of 
peer reporting (6 percent to 12 percent), the reporter was a (per-
ceived) victim of the wrongdoer (e.g., sexual harassment and violence 
among colleagues). Peers (who were not victims) reporting on other 
peers was a tiny category, only 9 percent. Th erefore, we can conclude 
that the earlier impression—that most internal integrity investiga-
tions in public organizations stem from internal whistle-blowers—is 
wrong.
Anonymous reports from the collective archives could be counted 
on one hand. Th e few that existed came from both administrators 
and civilians.
Types of Violations
Category 1 represents all integrity violations broken down by organ-
ization. Th e city of Amsterdam mostly concerned “fraud and theft” 
(46 percent). Th is category at correctional institutions was one-
third of that (13 percent), having “private time misconduct” as its 
leader (33 percent). Th e latter mostly involved improper (typically 
amorous) relationships with prisoners. “Misuse and manipulation of 
information”—usually involving police information leaks—domi-
nated violations in the Amsterdam police force (45 percent), with 
“private time misconduct” in second place at 23 percent.
Category 2 (theft without a suspect) was normally populated by 
theft within the organization, occurrences apparently common to 
all organizations. Although usually reported by peers, we must note 
that reporting an unidentiﬁ ed suspect entails a completely diﬀ erent 
decision-making process (emotionally and otherwise) from report-
ing a colleague.
Category 3 (employees who were also perceived victims of an in-
tegrity violation) comprised “discrimination and sexual harassment” 
cases, including cases of violence.
In peer reporting (category 4), all types of integrity violations were 
involved in all organizations, but they were not evenly spread out. 
Th e city of Amsterdam had two clear leaders, “fraud and theft” (30 
percent) and “waste and abuse of resources” (26 percent). Th e most 
common violation reported in the Amsterdam police force was 
“misuse and manipulation of information” (31 percent). Th e most 
common types of peer reporting at correctional institutions involved 
“discrimination and sexual harassment” and “improper use of author-
ity” (25 percent each).
Th e reporters in categories 5 and 6 were citizens and companies, 
usually government “clients.” Cases reported by those with some-
thing at stake were more numerous than those reported by dis-
interested parties. Th ey represented all possible types of integrity 
violations although in the city of Amsterdam the reporters were 
most often (perceived) victims of “corruption” and “fraud and theft” 
(46 percent together). Th e police reports evidenced mainly cases 
of unnecessary violence (30 percent) and misuse and manipula-
tion of information (34 percent). At the correctional institutions, 
most reports by inmates were equally spread among (1) suspicion of 
corruption (smuggling cell phones, marijuana, etc.), (2) improper 
violence against inmates, and (3) improper contact with inmates 
(usually by female guards).
The Reasons for Reporting
Reasons for Reporting in All Categories
Of all the categories in the previous section, the reasons for report-
ing became immediately clear, except when (nonvictim) peers 
reported. Public administrators reported because of a speciﬁ c duty 
to do so (category 1); the reports were role-prescribed disclosures. 
Often, as with accountants, the report was an explicit part of a 
professional standard of the reporter (Davis 2002). Th is can also be 
labeled “institutionalized particular organizational reporting.” Usu-
ally the reporter and the wrongdoer in these cases were colleagues 
in the sense that they worked in the same organization but not in 
the same area; there was no direct work relationship. How well they 
knew each other depended on the organization and case contingen-
cies. It became clear that the incentives for reporters in category 1 
were very strong and that reasons not to report were few or none.
Th e reasons for reporting theft (category 2) were clear: something 
was noted to be stolen, reported, and documented. Th e reporter 
rarely knew whether the wrongdoer was a colleague or cleaning staﬀ . 
Th e thief was almost never found.
Reasons for reporting when the reporter was the (perceived) victim 
of the integrity violation (category 3) were straightforward: the 
reporter wanted the violation stopped and the wrongdoer punished. 
From the archives, it became clear that this did not mean the reports 
were easy to make (cf. Knapp et al. 1997). On the contrary, victims 
of integrity violations by colleagues have to overcome a high barrier 
to report, which we expand on later.
Th e reasons for reporting in the peer-reporting category (4) were 
vague. Little information was found in the ﬁ les. (We expand on this 
point later as well.)
Reasons to report in category 5 had to do with the reporter’s stake 
in the case: the reporter wanted an unjust, unacceptable, or harmful 
situation corrected. Th e few cases in which citizen reporters had no 
stake, category 6, are beyond the purview of this article and will 
not be studied in depth. We know from the literature (e.g., Gorta 
and Forell 1995) that citizens are hesitant to report suspicions of 
governmental fraud and corruption. In general, citizens are hesitant 
to report white-collar crime and crime with no direct victims, which 
is usually the case in governmental integrity violations when the 
reporter is not the victim. Skogan (1984) draws similar conclusions 
in a review article on citizen reporting determinants.
Peer Reporting
Because the reasons to report in the peer-reporting category were 
not immediately clear, we conducted interviews. Except where 
mentioned, the interviews did not reveal organizational patterns. 
At the beginning of each section describing the research ﬁ ndings on 
reasons for peers to report, we present the proposition that ema-
nated from the material. We then discuss study data leading to the 
proposition. Finally, we juxtapose the propositions with the existing 
knowledge on whistle-blowing. Where possible, we discuss case 
details to illustrate the ﬁ ndings. Anonymity requirements prevent 
in-depth case story presentations.
Proposition 1. Th e strongest reason to peer report in the public context 
is a sense of justice. Th e integrity violation was perceived as worthy of 
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action. In other words, the reporters witnessing the violation found 
it so morally compelling that they had to tell somebody.
“As long as I didn’t report—it took me several days—I knew I 
wouldn’t be able to sleep.”
“You have to draw a line. Th is was clearly unnecessary vio-
lence, so I had to report it.”
“Integrity is number one for me. I don’t want bad apples in 
our organization.”
“For me it wasn’t a tough decision. If I ﬁ nd that something 
isn’t right, I report it.”
“If you know about something and don’t report, you tacitly 
cooperate.”
“I have a strong sense of justice, that’s in my character.”
“I would have regretted it immensely if I hadn’t reported. 
What he did was clearly wrong, so he had to be punished.”
“We correct inmates if they show wrong behavior. If you don’t 
do the same as a guard, you’re lowering yourself.”
In short, a sense of justice compelled the reporter to report. What 
Pershing (2003, 150) calls loyalty to the institution—one of two 
conﬂ icting loyalties—can now be called loyalty to a sense of justice. 
In moral philosophical terms, the integrity or moral self-image 
needs to be protected (cf. Musschenga 2004), which induces a 
person to act. A “sense of justice” was never worded as “sense of ob-
ligation” to the public. No one explicitly referred to a public service 
ethic (cf. Brewer and Selden 1998).
A sense of justice as a reason for reporting is closely connected to 
the gravity of the integrity violation. “It depends on the serious-
ness of the violation. It has to be grave enough for me to report it.” 
Reporters often mentioned that they had witnessed small integrity 
violations but did not report them. In cases with more than one 
witness to a violation, we asked the reporter why the other(s) had 
not reported. An often-mentioned reason was that the colleague 
apparently did not ﬁ nd the violation serious enough. Based on this, 
we can hypothesize that one diﬀ erence between a reporter and silent 
observer may lie in the perception of the violation’s seriousness. 
Th is, too, is a diﬀ erence in sense of justice.
Some support for proposition 1 can be found in the wider whistle-
blowing literature; several scholars looked at the moral judgment and 
values of whistle-blowers. For example, Rothschild and Miethe note 
that “[m]any said that their own personal values, grounded in their 
religious or humane traditions, moved them. Of our interviewed re-
spondents, 79 percent spoke of the personally held values that drove 
them to act” (1999, 119). Similarly, Chiu (2003) found that ethical 
judgment is positively related to whistle-blowing intention among 
Chinese managers. Yet Miceli, Near, and Dworkin are not convinced:
Results from the meta-analysis and the qualitative data sug-
gest to us that employees believe that they would blow the 
whistle in the future or have blown in the past because of 
their values and that moral reasoning may predict how people 
say they would behave or how others should behave. But 
statistical evidence is scant that employees have actually blown 
the whistle because of moral reasoning or values. (2008, 59)
Proposition 2. Putting the security of the group at risk is an impor-
tant reason for the reporter in the public context to report. Related to a 
sense of justice is security of the group, a reason to report that was 
cited by all ﬁ ve prison guards interviewed. Th e integrity violations 
reported were unnecessary violence toward inmates, corruption, 
smuggling (especially of cell phones and soft drugs), and inappropri-
ate contact with inmates.
“I had to do something with the information … for our 
security that was important … When a colleague is corrupt, 
he endangers my safety too.”
“It is a matter of order and safety. She had a relationship with 
an inmate and he can ask her to bring stuﬀ  inside the walls. 
What if something happened? Th e lives of guards can depend 
on that.”
Th us, even though loyalty to peers and the fear of being called a 
“snitch” are important reasons not to report (as we will see shortly), 
within the violent atmosphere of correctional institutions, where 
guards work in small groups and are strongly interdependent, the 
most important reason to report is for the group itself. Reporters 
can live with themselves after because it can be justiﬁ ed to them-
selves and the group. Should colleagues accuse them of disloyalty to 
the group, they can argue that it was precisely their loyalty to their 
group that compelled them to act. Once the interests of the group 
are at stake, the loyalty conﬂ ict can be resolved.
Earlier research has noted that the type of wrongdoing is strongly 
correlated with whistle-blowing rates (e.g., Miceli, Near, and 
 Dworkin 2008, 79–80), but uncertainty exists about which types. 
Proposition 2 is about threatening the security of the group, and 
earlier studies (e.g., Treviño and Victor 1992; Victor, Treviño, and 
Shapiro 1993) corroborate this: when a violation is perceived as 
harming the group, the inclination to peer report will be higher.
Proposition 3. Protecting the wrongdoer is often a reason to peer report 
in the public context. In these cases, the reporter’s information is 
likely uncertain, but so harmful to the perceived wrongdoer that 
an investigation would allow redemption and thus safety: “We had 
to report to protect our colleague. A policeman cannot have these 
stories about him on the street, it’s dangerous. It had to be sorted 
out. If it wasn’t true, his name could be cleared.”
Scarce literature exists on proposition 3. It has been noted, 
however, that considerations of the wrongdoer play a role in the 
decision process of the reporter. Miethe (1999), for example, 
concludes that when the wrongdoer is considered a (close) friend, 
the potential reporter is less likely to report, and if he does so, he 
is more likely to report internally. Also related are studies that note 
that the greater the trust in organizational justice, the greater the 
chance of reporting problems (e.g., Goldman 2001; Treviño and 
Weaver 2001).
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Proposition 4. Self-protection is an important reason to peer report in 
the public context. Several interview statements supported self-pro-
tection as a reason to report.
“My boss once said, ‘if you don’t report the violation, you’ll be 
punished.’”
“All weekend I doubted whether to report. But I saw it and if 
I didn’t report, I’d commit an oﬀ ense myself, even though 
I didn’t do anything wrong! I didn’t want to be drawn in by 
him.”
“What if my boss had found out in another way? Th en he 
would have known that I had known but didn’t tell him. 
Th at’s against the law.”
Th e broader whistle-blowing literature also oﬀ ers some support. On 
whistle-blowers in general, Rothschild and Miethe note, “In another 
11 percent of these cases, their motivations would have to be clas-
siﬁ ed as chieﬂ y defensive, in the sense that they feared that if they 
did not report and the malfeasance was eventually discovered, that it 
would be blamed on them” (1999, 119).
Proposition 5. Fear of what will happen to the reporter is an impor-
tant argument for him or her not to peer report in the public context. 
Th e reporters also mentioned several strong reasons not to report. 
One reason often mentioned by our interviewees was the fear of 
what would happen to their own lives, mainly with respect to 
how other colleagues would react. “Ratting out” on colleagues is 
unpopular.
“We’re not just talking about my colleagues here, they’re 
 also my friends. You don’t want to be placed out of the 
group.”
“A colleague of mine had been in a similar situation. In his 
case the wrongdoer wasn’t ﬁ red. Because of that, my colleague 
felt that the organization had concluded that he was wrong 
and the wrongdoer was right. He didn’t dare even look at the 
wrongdoer ever again.”
“Snitches are not tolerated in our organization.”
“When you report, you have no life anymore in our 
 organization.”
“Other colleagues don’t report because of a strong group 
 feeling. It has to do with collegiality.”
“In our group there’s a strong sense of never ratting on each 
other. Older colleagues are especially in favor of that.”
Even if the reporter remained anonymous to the group, most 
 mentioned that they do not like to feel like a “snitch.”
Th ere is also an understandable fear for the consequences when the 
perceived wrongdoer is the reporter’s supervisor: “He’s my boss and 
when he gets only a disciplinary sanction, he’ll still be my boss, the 
one who judges me. Th en I don’t have a life anymore!”
Th e perceived reaction of the organization is also important.
“I reported something before. I was afraid they would say, 
‘Th ere he goes again.’”
“From the past I knew it was useless to report a corps com-
mander. I’d get in trouble and they’d do nothing with the 
report.”
Seeing a colleague report and perceiving the organization’s reaction 
as wrong (too severe, nothing at all) is an important reason to forgo 
reporting in the future. Th is harks back to Organ (1990), who pro-
posed that extrarole behaviors are more likely when employees per-
ceive a just organizational environment. Similarly, Victor, Treviño, 
and Shapiro (1993) conclude that the inclination to report a peer 
for theft in a restaurant is associated with procedural and retributive 
justice perceptions (cf. Skarlicki and Folger 1997).
Much has been written about this proposition in the wider lit-
erature, and much of it is supportive (cf. Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran 2005; Maesschalck and Ornelis 2003; Miceli, Near, 
and Dworkin 2008; Near and Miceli 1996; Vandekerckhove 2006). 
Whistle-blowers fear group retaliation, and rightfully so. According 
to Johnson: “Th e pattern across countless examples, almost without 
exception, is that the individual whistleblower experiences reprisals” 
(2003, 93).
Proposition 6. Fear of what will happen to the wrongdoer is an 
 important argument for reporters not to peer report in the public 
 context. Th is proposition was surprising in that it is rarely  mentioned 
in the literature on whistle-blowing, but is widely supported by our 
interviewees.
“Once there is an investigation, it could inﬂ uence his life, not 
just his career, but his life.”
“If you report and it turns out he did it, he could get ﬁ red.”
“I thought long and hard about the possible consequences for 
the wrongdoer. When you report, you decide about someone’s 
job. Maybe about his marriage or life. Th at is not to be taken 
lightly!”
“Reporting could mean a loss of income for him.”
“He was a colleague and you do think about the consequences 
for a colleague.”
“In general, you want to protect a colleague, that’s a loyalty 
issue.”
Th is is also true for possible negative consequences of being a 
 suspect.
“I didn’t want to harm anyone. I asked my boss to be very 
careful with him, and to tell as few people as possible. If you 
take that ﬁ rst step and it turns out that nothing was wrong, 
she’s still damaged. And if nothing is wrong, she doesn’t 
deserve that. I don’t want to unfairly harm someone. Not 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
A Report on Reporting 775
surprisingly, the closer the reporter is to the wrongdoer, or 
the more negative the consequences for the wrongdoer are 
perceived, the tougher it is to report.”
“If he had been a close colleague, I would have tried to stop 
him privately. Th en I would never have told my boss.”
“When you face the person you reported every day, that 
makes it tougher.”
Th e available evidence as well as the person and type of violation 
play a role in the decision process. “Before you report something 
like that, you want to be sure. Before you destroy someone’s career. 
I wasn’t sure at ﬁ rst, and that’s why I didn’t report earlier.” Many 
perceivers of integrity violations conﬁ rm their suspicions with an 
investigation of their own before they report. Widely rumored 
wrongdoers are easier to report because the reporter’s likelihood of 
being right is higher. If the reporter is the only one with informa-
tion, reliability of the information is more tenuous.
Reasons to Report: A Summary
We have conﬁ rmed the hypothesis that peer 
reporters ﬁ nd themselves in a situation of 
 conﬂ icting loyalties. Th ey have to balance 
their loyalty to a sense of justice against 
their loyalty to the group in general and the 
wrongdoer in particular. Reporters often feel 
like victims. “I did nothing wrong, yet I was 
in this diﬃ  cult situation I didn’t ask for.” 
Th erefore, it is notable that only in one case 
did the reporter blame the wrongdoer for this. 
Reporters are in a confusing situation. Th ey 
can be labeled a “snitch,” with all of the negative social consequenc-
es that this implies. But the social constructions of these labels are 
themselves confusing. Reporters struggle with identity: sometimes 
they feel like heroes and sometimes cowards.
Insights Relevant to a Good Reporting Policy
Doubts, the Reporter–Wrongdoer Relationship, 
and Anonymous Reporting
About one-third of the interviewees said they had little or no doubt 
before reporting.
“It was not a tough decision. I ﬁ nd leaking information 
wrong. I had to report.”
“I had no doubt, not on an earlier report I made either. If 
I ﬁ nd that something is wrong, I simply report it.”
Clearly, the reasons to report are the same for doubters and non-
doubters: something is wrong and has to be reported. Th e diﬀ erence 
between them is not surprising: the arguments not to report did 
not play a role in the decision process of the nondoubters. Th e only 
reason for peers in this group not to come forward is information 
uncertainty.
An interesting issue is how and whether animosity plays a role in 
peer reporting, as mentioned in the literature on whistle-blowing 
(e.g., Near and Miceli 1996), in the sense that the report is intended 
to settle a personal score. We conclude that this rarely plays a role. 
Only ﬁ ve of the 25 cases revealed a bad relationship between the 
reporter and the wrongdoer (at least one in each organization). And 
in three of these cases, the relationship was not rancorous: “I didn’t 
like her that much.” Th ere is also evidence that in some cases, the 
reporter did not care what would happen to the wrongdoer. In only 
two cases were there possible signs (in either the interviews or the 
ﬁ les) of rancor, but it seemed to have played an insigniﬁ cant role.
Th e reasons to report diﬀ er only slightly with the reporter–wrong-
doer relationship. In the case of a bad relationship, however, report-
ing is easier. Th e reporter has fewer doubts about reporting and 
penalties for the wrongdoer are not a consideration.
“I hardly knew him. When you know someone longer, taking 
the step to report is much harder.”
“I did not doubt: the step was easy because you don’t do what 
he did. It wasn’t a colleague who was popular in our group. 
She was an outsider.”
“I never worried about what would hap-
pen with her. I didn’t like her. She didn’t 
belong there: a professional can’t mistreat 
minors. Th ese little boys were defenseless. 
Th at’s wrong, period. Th at’s not even up 
for discussion.”
It was often expressed that if the relationship 
had been good, taking the initiative would 
have been harder:
“When you like someone, it’s hard to report on him.”
“In general, you weigh the consequences for the person you 
report on, in this case not because I didn’t like him, but in 
general it’s your moral duty; he could lose his job! In good 
relationships, it is more common to ﬁ rst address the perceived 
wrongdoer.”
“It makes a diﬀ erence if you know someone well or not. In 
that case, you can directly ask the person about it. But if you 
barely know him, you report.”
All respondents were explicitly asked whether they had considered 
reporting anonymously. Only one of the 25 had done so, but, 
“I would never do that again.” And the rest agreed: anonymous 
 reporting is not a good option, for two reasons: (1) in most cases, 
it is clear to everyone who reported anyway, and (2) it feels 
“unfair.”
“Anonymous reporting is cowardly in my eyes.”
“Th ose kinds of things should be done openly and honestly.”
Th e use of the words “openly” and “honestly” is interesting. With 
these strong feelings, a reporter turns away from being “sneaky,” 
“untrustworthy,” or “cowardly.” Being labeled a betrayer, tattler, 
snitch, informer or traitor (Å´kerstrom 1991, 67) is bad enough; it 
We have conﬁ rmed the 
hypothesis that peer reporters 
ﬁ nd themselves in a situation 
of conﬂ icting loyalties. Th ey 
have to balance their loyalty to 
a sense of justice against their 
loyalty to the group in general 
and the wrongdoer in particular.
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is worse to feel like one, and anonymous reporting can accomplish 
just that.4 While it is possible that reporters diﬀ er in this respect 
from  silent observers, it is unlikely. As mentioned, anonymous 
reports were rare in all organizations, despite the opportunity. 
Th e drawbacks to anonymity are supported in the recent whistle-
blower literature review by Miceli, Near, and Dworkin 
(2008, 158).
The Reporter’s Fate and the Role of the Bureaus
Th e feelings of the reporter after making the report diﬀ ered sharply. 
Some who had doubted for a long time about reporting had a sense 
of relief. “I did good. It gives a clean feeling.” But most had mixed 
feelings.
“I rang the bell, but did I do the right thing? I lay awake for 
many nights.”
“After making the report I felt bad. I snitched on someone. 
He will lose his job. And he already had ﬁ nancial problems.”
Furthermore, the impact of making the report is often larger than 
feared. “I never thought that telling something to my boss over a 
cup of coﬀ ee would have such an impact. I had regrets: what had 
I done? I didn’t sleep for weeks. Th ere was much turmoil in our 
organization because of what I said.”
As hypothesized from the whistle-blowing literature, there were 
strong repercussions in those cases in which colleagues knew who 
made the report.
“I was ignored by several groups of colleagues. Th ey called me 
a snitch and accused me of betrayal. I had to defend myself 
for weeks, even though someone else did something wrong.”
“I can’t handle it anymore. I’m looking for a new job.”
Th is last case is an exception. Even though the repercussions are 
tougher than expected, most reporters function (reasonably) nor-
mally in the long run. Yet, as Heard and Miller (2006) stress, reports 
of retaliation should be taken seriously and followed up on.
As mentioned, group processes are important, and so is collegial re-
action to reporters. “How your colleagues react is important. It plays 
a big role. You’re afraid people will get an image of you that you 
don’t like.” In some cases, the colleagues did not know who reported. 
Th e reactions of those who did know diﬀ ered strongly. Sometimes 
the reporter was ignored and blamed. Others sided with the reporter.
“I told two colleagues. Th ey agreed with me. Th at was an 
important conﬁ rmation. I didn’t want to be a snitch.”
“I got positive reactions from my colleagues like, ‘how brave 
of you. I wouldn’t have dared.’”
When the whole organization knew who reported, the reporter ap-
preciated being able to explain the report to the group and having 
leadership on her side. “My boss said in a meeting how happy he 
was with me, how everyone should be. I hardly got any criticism 
from my group.”
Compliments from the bureaus were exceptional. Almost all reporters 
complained about how the organizations dealt with the reporter after 
the report. Two complaints surfaced: the reporters were not told what 
happened after their report, and they were not thanked in any way. 
“Th e wrongdoer was ﬁ red, but I never heard that from the bureau.”
Some form of appreciation turns out to be valuable to reporters. 
Th is cannot be overly stressed. Th ey are not looking for monetary 
rewards (they would feel even more like a Judas), but some sort of 
conﬁ rmation that they did the right thing, a reaﬃ  rmation of their 
value. In their confusing process of identity reconstruction, they 
need positive support. Th ey made clear that after the reports, doubts 
linger; they were still confused and trying to make sense of the 
situation. Being reassured is important, especially from leadership. 
Instead, most reporters had the feeling that the bureaus and leaders 
thought what they did was routine. Th e reporters had no sympathy 
for the emotionally tough situation they had been in.
“Th ey never said, ‘Well done!’”
“I didn’t need a pat on the back, but ‘Th ank you for reporting’ 
would have been nice. I would have known that I was doing 
what I was supposed to.”
Th e few expressions of appreciation were gratefully received. “I got 
a thumbs-up from the bureau. Th at’s good, it’s important to know 
that there are people behind you.”
It is also important to peer reporters that the report be taken seri-
ously and that some feedback is given, even if the decision is for no 
further action. Heard and Miller (2006) stress this. Th e reporter 
needs to trust that the matter will not wind up in someone’s desk 
drawer. “Nothing happened, and I heard nothing about it, ever.” Yet 
the other side of the coin is that the reporter also needs to trust that 
the organization will not overreact, that the wrongdoer will get fair 
treatment.
Discussion and Implications for Public Management
Only 9 percent of integrity violation cases in public organizations 
were started by peer reporting. Although this could be a reason to 
reevaluate internal reporting systems, a strong case can be made to 
remain sharp in routine supervision because we now know that ap-
proximately one-third of cases originate with institutional functions 
of control and investigation (table 3). Nor should the organization 
overreact. Distrust breeds distrust, as Luhmann (1979) notes. Be-
cause total eradication of integrity violations is impossible, remain-
ing vigilant in routine controls is recommended.
Th e most important reason to report suspicion of a colleague’s 
integrity violation is a sense of justice. Th e reporter considers the 
situation wrong and feels that something should be done. Other 
important aspects are the security of the group or organization, the 
seriousness of the violation, and protection of the wrongdoer. Th e 
most important argument for reporters not to report is, as we might 
expect, the negative consequences for the reporter. A surprising 
reason not to report is the negative consequences for the wrong-
doer: the reporter feels responsible for the wrongdoer’s punishment. 
Other considerations include the perceived reaction of the organiza-
tion and the reporter’s quality of evidence. In general, peer reports 
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are not rancorous. Anonymous reporting is 
rare because it makes the reporter feel sneaky 
or untrustworthy.
Recommendations
Based on the ﬁ ndings of this study, we oﬀ er 
the following general recommendations for 
public organizations:
Promote an open culture in which 
doubts and insecurities about integrity can be discussed, one in 
which employees who overstep the mark are addressed by their 
colleagues and serious integrity violations are reported. After 
studying government guerrillas, O’Leary oﬀ ers similar advice: 
“Create an organization culture that accepts, welcomes, and 
encourages candid dialogue and debate” (2006, 109). Avoid dam-
aging the social fabric of trust and cooperation. Urging employees 
to report every wrong detail of a coworker could create what Case 
(1987) refers to as a “suspicion awareness context.” Peer reporting 
should not undermine the stability and trust within groups (King 
and Hermodson 2000).
Design a reporting protocol and discuss it with supervisors. 
Find out which integrity violations are most common in the or-
ganization and which are most serious. Communicate within the 
organization what actions will not be tolerated and the impor-
tance of public administrators reporting serious violations. Some 
examples from Victor, Treviño, and Shapiro: “Management may 
prescribe responsibility for peer reporting in codes of conduct 
and/or job descriptions, redeﬁ ning peer reporting as an in-role 
rather than an extra-role behavior. Management may also highlight 
ways in which a co-worker’s misconduct harms other workgroup 
members” (1993, 261–62). Th e last suggestions resonate well with 
the ﬁ ndings of this study on the importance to peer reporters of 
integrity violations that harm the (the security of the) group.
Design a reporting procedure in which the report is taken 
seriously and without organizational overreaction. Decide what is 
considered fair punishment for speciﬁ c violations.
Give the reporter attention and oﬀ er guidance. Tailor it to 
the particular situation. Discuss with the reporter the guidance 
that would best help. Try to ﬁ nd out for which group processes a 
reporter fears. Conﬁ rm that the reporter did the right thing and 
express appreciation. Most importantly, let the reporter know 
what steps were taken.
Th e most logical person a peer reports to is someone who is 
trusted. In most cases, this is the supervisor. An alternate superior 
should be available in the case of a bad employee–supervisor 
relationship. A central reporting place in the organization would 
take care of other contingencies. As a last resort (these cases 
should be very rare), give opportunity to report anonymously; in 
some cases, it is necessary to protect the reporter. Th is should not 
be encouraged, however, and anonymity should not extend so 
far as to preclude communication with the reporter for purposes 
of investigation. Having diﬀ erent options is similar to O’Leary’s 
advice: “Create multiple channels for dissent” (2006, 114).
Two-thirds of our interviewees had serious or very serious doubts 
before reporting. A conﬂ ict of loyalty renders no choice right. Public 
organizations ought to consider, then, how potential reporters can be 
helped and supported through this tough process and loyalty 
•
•
•
•
•
conﬂ ict. If many of our interviewees had 
serious doubts about reporting, imagine the 
number of integrity and/or law violations that 
remain hidden because the decisions of poten-
tial reporters fell to the side of “silent observer.”
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Notes
1. Th is typology was the outcome of an analysis of the literature on police integrity 
and corruption and was assessed against the results of empirical research on inter-
nal investigations in the police force. It was important in developing the typology 
that it included the following:
All types of relevant behavior: behavior within the organization, interaction 
with external actors (citizens), and private time behavior as far as was relevant to 
the organization
All types of relevant moral norms and values: in laws and rules, in internal 
codes and procedures, and in the unwritten, informal norms and values
Behavior contrary to the organization’s interest, favoring the organization, but 
harming relevant social norms and values
2. For interesting exceptions, see Rothschild and Miethe (1999), King and 
 Hermodson (2000), and Pershing (2003).
3. Th e full name is the Police Department of Amsterdam-Amstelland.
4. In some cases, it was a good option to ask the bureau to keep their identity secret 
to their colleagues (conﬁ dentiality), but that is anther issue.
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